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ABSTRACT

Consumers form consideration sets by screening from all available alternatives.
Consumers typically utilize one of two types of screening strategies: an exclusion screening
strategy wherein alternatives not worthy of further consideration are rejected or an inclusion
strategy wherein worthy alternatives are selected for further evaluation. Extant literature has
documented the important role played by screening strategies in decision making. However,
there is very limited understanding of when and why consumers may employ one screening
strategy over the other as well the impact of the screening strategy for decision accuracy. This
dissertation attempts to study the antecedent and consequence of screening strategies. Essay 1 in
this dissertation, investigates the role of consumers‟ perceived uncertainty on the choice of
screening strategy. Four studies in this essay show that when consumers are highly uncertain
they are more likely to choose exclusion screening strategy; whereas when they are less
uncertain they are more likely to use inclusion screening. Mediation analyses in Studies 1 and 2
show that the choice of screening strategy is primarily driven by perceived accuracy of the
strategy. Study 3 demonstrates that the effect of uncertainty on the choice of screening strategy is
moderated by consideration set size. When uncertain consumers form smaller sets they are more
likely to use exclusion screening, but this relationship flips when they form larger consideration
sets. Finally, external validity for the relationship between uncertainty and choice of screening
strategy is demonstrated in Study 4 using the popular TV game show Who Wants to be a
Millionaire?
Essay two in this dissertation, investigates the role of perceived uncertainty and
consideration set size on the relationship between screening strategy and objective accuracy of
iii

the decision. Utilizing an experimental study with an actual choice task, I demonstrate that
perceived uncertainty moderates the screening strategy-decision accuracy relationship. Further,
this interactive relationship is contingent on consideration set sizes. Whereas consumers with
high perceived uncertainty make higher quality decisions with inclusion while forming smaller
consideration sets, their decision quality is higher with exclusion when forming larger sets.
Likewise, while consumers with low perceived uncertainty make more accurate decisions with
exclusion when forming smaller sets, the accuracy of their decisions increases with inclusion
when forming larger sets.
This dissertation contributes to literature on screening strategies by explicating perceived
uncertainty as a critical factor that leads to consumers preferring one screening strategy versus
the other. Furthermore, it adds to our understanding of an important consequence of using
screening strategies – decision accuracy.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1: Dissertation Overview
This dissertation aims to study the antecedents and consequences of using
screening strategies in decision making. The dissertation consists of two essays that seek
to answer the following questions: (1) Given that consumers face uncertainty while
making decisions in a variety of contexts, what role does perceived uncertainty play in
the choice of screening strategy? (2) Does the choice of screening strategy influence the
objective accuracy of decisions, especially given that consumers may experience varying
levels of uncertainty during decision making? This dissertation contributes to literature
on screening strategies by explicating perceived uncertainty as a critical factor that leads
to consumers preferring one screening strategy versus the other. Furthermore, it adds to
our understanding of an important consequence of using screening strategies. This
research adds to the existing body of research in screening strategies that has established
that the two screening strategies are fundamentally different from each other, but yet
limited research has investigated the antecedents and consequences of choosing one
strategy versus the other. This dissertation attempts to fill the void by investigating the
research questions mentioned above. The first essay uses a set of three internally valid
experimental studies and one externally valid data from a TV game show to demonstrate
the theoretical relationships. The second essay analyses data from an experimental study
in an actual choice context to show support to the theorized relationships.
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 1 reviews the literature on
screening strategies and provides a brief overview of the two essays that follow. Chapter
1

2 investigates an antecedent of screening strategies and Chapter 3 examines the
consequence of screening strategies.

1.2: Screening Strategies Overview
When consumers choose from a number of available alternatives they typically
form a smaller subset of alternatives called the consideration set from which they make
the final choice (Bettman 1979; Nedungadi 1990; Beach 1990). The process of narrowing
down the number of alternatives that will be finally evaluated is called screening (Beach
1993) and is utilized by consumers because they typically lack the resources or ability to
evaluate the plethora of alternatives available to them (Bettman 1979; Nedungadi 1990;
Olshavsky 1979; Payne 1976; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993). Screening also
reduces the chances of making a bad choice (Beach 1990; Beach and Mitchell 1987,
1990) by allowing consumers to consider more information about each option and thus
make better quality decisions (Alba et al. 1997; Lynch and Ariely 2000; Roberts &
Nedungadi 1995). The mere act of screening influences the nature of final choice
(Chakravarti, Janiszewski, and Ulkumen 2006) and hence is not merely a stage in the
decision process but important in its own right (Potter and Beach 1994).
Published literature has documented the existence of two types of screening
strategies employed by consumers to form consideration sets: an exclusion strategy
wherein alternatives not worthy of further consideration are eliminated and an inclusion
strategy wherein worthy alternatives are included into the consideration set (e.g. Yaniv
and Schul 1997, 2000). With inclusion, consumers have to decide whether each
alternative should be seriously considered for the final choice. On the other hand, with
2

exclusion consumers have to decide for each alternative, whether that alternative should
be dropped from further consideration (Heller, Levin, and Goransson 2002). At the outset
it may be appear that the alternatives that are not eliminated will be included in the
consideration set and hence the two screening strategies are complementary processes.
However, these two screening strategies differ systematically from each other. First, the
underlying psychological processes of the two screening strategies are different such that
for inclusion strategy, the implied status-quo is no option and inclusion of each
alternative in to the set requires good evidence. The status-quo for exclusion process
consists of the full set and eliminating an alternative requires good evidence (Levin,
Prosansky, Heller, and Brunick 2001; Yaniv and Schul 1997, 2000). Second, consumers
use different cut-offs while using the two screening strategies (Yaniv and Schul 1997,
2000). Third, sets created by using exclusion are systematically larger than those created
by inclusion (Levin, Jasper, and Forbes 1998; Levin, Huneke, and Jasper 2000; Yaniv
and Schul 1997, 2000). Thus, the two screening strategies differ systematically from each
other in terms of the underlying psychological processes, the criteria employed, and
potential outcomes (Yaniv and Schul 1997, 2000).
Extant literature has pointed to the important role that screening strategies play in
decision making (Beach 1990, 1993; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993). The type of
screening strategy employed influences the size and composition of consideration sets
(Levin, Huneke, and Jasper 2000; Yaniv and Schul 1997, 2000) as well as the final
choice and purchase likelihood (Chakravarti, Janiszewski, and Ulkumen 2006; Levin,
Schreiber, Lauriola, and Gaeth 2002; Park, Jun, and MacInnis 2000). Thus, the type of
screening strategy employed may have far reaching consequences for the consumer and
3

merits further understanding of this phenomenon. This dissertation aims to provide
insights to the phenomenon of screening by understanding when and why consumers
prefer to use one screening strategy versus the other as well as the consequences of using
the screening strategies.

1.3: Essay 1 Overview
Consumers form a smaller subset of all available alternatives using one of two
screening strategies: an inclusion strategy or an exclusion screening strategy (Yaniv and
Schul 1997; 2000). Extant literature has predominantly focused on the outcomes of using
the screening strategies. For example, it has been demonstrated that the choice of
screening strategy has an impact on the characteristics of the consideration set (Yaniv and
Schul 1997; 2000) as well as final choice (Park, Jun, and MacInnis 2000; Shafir 1993).
Yet, there is very limited understanding of the factors that influence the choice of one
screening strategy versus the other. Ordonez, Benson, and Beach (1999), for instance,
suggest that consumers employ exclusion strategy as the normal screening strategy.
However, recent research has pointed out that perceived difficulty of the task (Heller,
Levin, and Gorannson 2002) and valence of the task (Levin et al. 2001) impacts which
screening strategy is preferred by consumers. In this essay, I investigate (1) whether
perceived uncertainty influences the choice of one screening strategy versus the other, (2)
what underlying mechanism drives the perceived uncertainty – screening strategy
relationship?, and (3) whether the relationship between perceived uncertainty and
screening strategy depends on the varying number of alternatives considered in the
consideration set.
4

Consumers commonly experience feelings of uncertainty during decision making
(Hansen 1976; Kahn and Sarin 1988) and perceived uncertainty has been shown to
influence the choice of decision heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman 1974), assignment of
attribute weights (Kahn and Meyer 1991), and information search strategies (Jacoby,
Jaccard, Currim, Kuss, Ansari, and Troutman 1994). In this essay, I argue that perceived
uncertainty impacts the choice of screening strategy such that under conditions of high
perceived uncertainty consumers will favor exclusion screening strategy, whereas under
conditions of low perceived uncertainty, inclusion screening strategy will be preferred. I
draw upon literature from consumer learning and probabilistic reasoning to explain this
theoretical relationship.
I conduct a series of 4 studies to test the relationship between perceived
uncertainty and screening strategy. In Study 1, I use a within-subject experiment to show
that highly uncertain consumers are more likely to use exclusion screening strategy. In
Study 2, I replicate this finding using a between-subjects experiment in another product
category. Further, Studies 1 and 2 also demonstrate that the choice of screening strategy
is driven by perceived accuracy of screening strategies. In Study 3, I show that the
relationship between perceived uncertainty and screening strategy flips when consumers
form larger consideration sets (as opposed to smaller ones). Finally, in Study 4, I use data
from a popular TV game show “Who Wants to be a Millionaire?” to confirm the
relationship between perceived uncertainty and screening strategy in an externally valid
decision-making setting.

5

1.4: Essay 2 Overview
The objective of essay one was to investigate the impact of screening strategy on
the choice of screening strategy. The focus of essay two is to understand the consequence
of using the screening strategy for objective decision accuracy. This is an important
research question, given that: (1) an important motivation to employ screening strategies
is to improve the quality of choice (Beach 1990, 1993; Beach and Mitchell 1990), and (2)
there is little consensus on the outcome of screening strategy use, especially on the
objective accuracy of the final choice. Understanding the quality of final choice is not
only important because screening is supposed to improve decision quality but also
because numerous consumer decisions are rife with uncertainty and in such situations, the
screening strategy chosen by the consumer should improve the decision accuracy as
compared to the other strategy. In other words, use of a wrong screening strategy may
potentially lead consumers to make suboptimal choices.
Literature on consumer information search in decision making (Payne, Bettman,
and Johnson 1993) provides the theoretical rationale for this essay. A more intense search
associated with the using inclusion screening strategy (Levin, Huneke, and Jasper 2000)
while helping consumers with high perceived uncertainty develop their preferences as
they go through the decision process, hurts consumers with low perceived uncertainty by
diluting their initial preferences. Thus, I argue that highly uncertain consumers make
more objectively accurate decisions using inclusion strategy, whereas those with low
perceived uncertainty are better off using exclusion screening strategy. Furthermore, I
argue that this interactive effect of perceived uncertainty and screening strategy on

6

objective decision accuracy flips when consumers form larger consideration sets (as
opposed to smaller sets).
I test the theoretical predictions in an experimental study that employs an actual
decision making task. The study requires participants to screen from multiple available
alternatives and then choose one alternative. Results support the prediction of a three-way
interactive relationship between perceived uncertainty, screening strategy and
consideration set size on the objective accuracy of decision.
In sum, this dissertation adds to existing body of literature in screening strategies
by explication an important factor that impacts the choice of one screening strategy over
the other. Also, it extends our current understanding regarding the consequence of using
one screening strategy versus the other.

7

CHAPTER TWO: INCLUSION VERSUS EXCUSION: THE EFFECT OF
PERCEIVED UNCERTAINTY ON SCREENING STRATEGIES
2.1: Abstract
Consumers form consideration sets by screening from all available alternatives.
Consumers typically utilize two types of screening strategies to form consideration sets: an
exclusion screening strategy, or an inclusion screening strategy. This paper investigates the role
of consumers‟ perceived uncertainty on the choice of screening strategy. Two studies in this
paper show that when consumers are highly uncertain they are more likely to choose exclusion
screening strategy; whereas when they are less uncertain they are more likely to use inclusion
screening. Further, the choice of screening strategy is primarily driven by the perceived decision
accuracy. The third experimental study shows that the effect of uncertainty on the choice of
screening strategy is moderated by consideration set size. When uncertain consumers form
smaller sets they are more likely to use exclusion screening, but this relationship flips when they
form larger consideration sets. Finally, external validity for the relationship between uncertainty
and choice of screening strategy is demonstrated using the popular TV game show Who Wants to
be a Millionaire?

8

2.2: Introduction
Consumers narrow down the number of alternatives they consider for final choice by
screening from all available alternatives (Beach 1990, 1993; Bettman 1979; Nedungadi 1990).
Published literature has documented the existence of two types of screening strategies employed
by consumers to form consideration sets: an exclusion strategy wherein alternatives not worthy
of further consideration are eliminated and an inclusion strategy wherein worthy alternatives are
included into the consideration set (e.g. Yaniv and Schul 1997; 2000). Despite the understanding
that the two screening strategies differ systematically from each other in terms of the underlying
psychological processes, the criteria employed, and potential outcomes (Yaniv and Schul 1997,
2000), there is relatively little understanding of the factors that influence the type of screening
strategy employed.
Ordonez, Benson, and Beach (1999) suggest that consumers employ exclusion strategy as
the normal screening process, however, other studies have implied that this may not be the case.
For example, when there is no single correct answer for the problem, when the task is not
perceived as difficult (Heller, Levin, and Goransson 2002), and the task is positive (e.g. hiring an
employee) (Levin et al. 2001), decision makers are more likely to choose inclusion screening
strategy. The implicit assumption underlying all these studies, however, is that consumers are
certain about the nature and outcomes of the available options, the evaluative criteria, and
individual preferences. Yet, these may not always be the case. Consumers frequently experience
uncertainty while making decisions. Research shows that such uncertainties arise from not
knowing the potential outcomes of the options, the individual‟s preferences, or the attributes and
decision rules that are relevant in the choice task (Urbany, Dickson, and Wilkie 1989). I propose
that such perceived uncertainty will influence the choice of screening strategy. Based on the
9

literatures on consumer learning (Alba and Hutchinson 1987; Johnson and Russo 1984) and
probabilistic reasoning (Tversky and Kahneman 1974), I argue that uncertain consumers are
more likely to use exclusion screening strategy because they anticipate making more accurate
decisions by using exclusion. Specifically, use of exclusion screening strategy allows uncertain
consumers to consider the full set of options and also more chances to learn. Uncertain
consumers also perceive exclusion screening strategy as receiving more evidence of being the
most typical course of action and hence a more accurate strategy. Finally, uncertain consumers‟
choice of screening strategy can be altered by the size of the consideration set through altering
both the learning opportunities and the probability of the most typical course of action.
The hypotheses are tested in three experimental and one non-experimental studies. In
studies 1and 2, I show that uncertain consumers are more likely to choose exclusion screening
strategy with accuracy considerations in mind. In study 3, I reverse this effect by showing that
when uncertain consumers form larger consideration sets (as opposed to smaller ones) they are
more likely to use inclusion screening strategy. Finally, I demonstrated in an externally valid TV
game show (study 4) that when contestants were highly uncertain during the choice task they
were more likely to use exclusion screening strategy.

2.3: Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses

2.3.1: Screening Strategies and Consideration Sets
Decision strategy, defined as “the process used to make a choice” (Machin 2006, p. 1),
can vary from a rejection-based decision strategy to a selection based decision strategy (Shafir
1993). The difference between the two strategies lies in the focus of the decision – rejecting the
10

undesired options or selecting the desired options (Shafir 1993). Such rejection or selectionbased decision strategies have been shown to influence both consideration set formation (e.g.
Heller, Levin, and Goranaaon 2002; Yaniv and Schul 1997, 2000) and final choice (e.g.
Chakravarti, Janiszewski, and Ulkumen 2006; Huber, Neale, and Northcraft 1987; Park, Jun, and
Macinnis 2000; Shafir 1993). In this paper, the focus is restricted to the influence of such
decision strategies used to form consideration sets, called consideration set formation strategies
or screening strategies.
Consumers screen from all available alternatives and form a smaller set of alternatives
they will evaluate before making the final choice (Beach 1993). Screening can be achieved by
one of two ways: 1) by screening in the alternatives that meet some predetermined criteria
(inclusion), or 2) by screening out the alternatives that fail to meet the predetermined criteria
(exclusion) (see Yaniv and Schul 1997, 2000 for a review). With inclusion, consumers have to
decide whether each alternative should be seriously considered for the final choice. On the other
hand, with exclusion consumers have to decide for each alternative, whether that alternative
should be dropped from further consideration (Heller, Levin, and Goransson 2002).
Extant literature has devoted considerable attention to the outcomes of using the
screening strategies, i.e. the characteristics of the consideration sets (Heller, Levin and
Goransson 2002; Levin, Huneke, and Jasper 2000; Levin, Prosansky, Heller, and Brunick 2001;
Yaniv and Schul 1997, 2000; Yaniv, Schul, Raphaeilli-Hirch, and Maoz 2001). A robust finding
is that inclusion strategy creates homogeneous smaller sets based on stringent evaluative criteria
whereas exclusion strategy typically creates larger heterogeneous consideration sets (Yaniv and
Schul 1997, 2000). Despite the growing body of evidence for the differential outcomes of the
two screening strategies, there is relatively little understanding regarding the factors influencing
11

the choice of one screening strategy versus the other. Notable exceptions are the findings that
suggest that when there is a single correct answer for the problem, when the task is perceived as
difficult (Heller, Levin, and Goransson 2002), and the task is negative (e.g. firing an employee)
(Levin et al. 2001) , decision makers are more likely to choose exclusion screening strategy.
These studies implicitly assume that decision makers are certain about the nature and outcomes
of the available options, the evaluative criteria, and individual preferences. Yet, these may not
always be the case. Consumers may often be unsure during the choice process and such
perceived uncertainty may influence the consideration set formation process, namely the choice
of screening strategy.

2.3.2: Uncertainty and Screening Strategies
Consumers frequently experience uncertainty while making consumption decisions. Such
uncertainties arise from not knowing the potential outcomes of the options, the individual‟s
preferences, or the attributes and decision rules that are relevant in the choice task. Such
perceived uncertainty has been shown to influence the choice of decision heuristic (Tversky and
Kahneman 1974), assignment of attribute weights (Kahn and Meyer 1991), and information
search strategies (Jacoby et al. 1994). Further, when consumers face uncertainty in the choice
process they form consideration sets by searching for options on the uncertain attribute (e.g.
price) (Mehta, Rajiv, and Srinivasan 2003) and such search and evaluation processes during
consideration set formation reduces consumers‟ perceptions of uncertainty (Hauser and
Wernerfelt 1990).Thus, it is reasonable to believe that perceived uncertainty during the
consideration set formation stage will influence the choice of screening strategy. In this paper, I
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propose that when consumers perceive high uncertainty in the decision process, they are more
likely to use exclusion screening strategy.
The process of screening prevents bad options from being considered and as such it is
primarily driven by the motivation to search and ultimately choose the best option (Beach 1990,
1993; Beach and Mitchell 1987, 1990). Thus, the choice of screening strategy should be one that
helps consumers make accurate decisions. In the following discussion, I will argue that
uncertain consumers are more likely to choose exclusion screening strategy because they
perceive it will lead to more accurate decision than would inclusion.

Consumer Learning
The relationship between uncertainty and the choice of screening strategy is supported by
two lines of reasoning. The first line of support comes from research on consumer learning (Alba
and Hutchinson 1987; Johnson and Russo 1984). While screening alternatives to form
consideration sets, exclusion screening strategy can be mentally represented as consisting of
more number of steps or decisions. This idea comes from the notion that the consideration set is
usually a small subset of all available options (Hauser and Wernerfelt 1990). Thus, while
forming a small consideration set (e.g. of four alternatives) from all available alternatives (e.g.
ten), use of exclusion screening strategy will involve making significantly more number of
decisions (e.g. six distinct decision to exclude alternatives). Use of inclusion screening strategy
on the other hand will involve making fewer decisions (e.g. four decisions to keep options for
further consideration). Therefore, exclusion screening strategy affords more chances to learn and
make better decisions. Such learning is especially beneficial to uncertain consumers to improve
their decision making.
13

Literature on consumer learning is replete with examples that provide evidence of
learning through repetition of the task. For example, repeated exposure to any stimuli, including
advertisements and product claims, has been shown to enhance learning. Such learning has been
demonstrated through recall (Zeilske 1959) and recognition of the repeated stimuli (Krugman
1972; 1977). Singh and Rothschild (1983) showed that repetition of advertisements lead to
increased recognition and recall of the product category, brand name, and advertisement claim.
Repetition of product claims also increases belief in the claims due to consumers‟ familiarity
with the repeated claims, especially during low-involvement processing (Hawkins and Hoch
1992). While judging alternatives, increased familiarity facilitates consumers‟ ability to learn
new product information through improved ability to encode and remember new information
(Johnson and Russo 1984). Finally, repeating any product related task improves task
performance (Alba and Hutchinson 1987). Therefore, uncertain consumers are more likely to
choose exclusion strategy because use of exclusion strategy affords more opportunities to learn
as compared to inclusion, thus increasing their chances of making more accurate decisions.

Probabilistic Reasoning
The second line of reasoning is provided by literature on probabilistic reasoning
(Kahneman and Tversky 1982; Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Literature in decision making is
replete with examples that show decision makers express their beliefs regarding the likelihood of
occurrence of an uncertain event in terms of subjective probabilities (e.g. Tversky and
Kahneman 1982). Kahneman and Tversky (1982) argued that uncertain decision makers
commonly use simplifying heuristics like mental simulation heuristics to assess probabilities of
unknown events or quantities. According to this view, decision makers create mental simulations
14

of the probability of the event by considering the perceived ease of achieving the event. Even
when multiple mental scenarios are generated, decision makers tend to use the most plausible
scenario to make probability judgment (Koehler 1994; Dougherty, Gettys, and Thomas 1997).
Similar evidence has been provided by research on prediction based on uncertain categorization,
where the most probable category is used to make prediction and all other categories are ignored
(Lagnado and Shanks 2003; Murphy and Ross 1994; Ross and Murphy 1996). Such a reliance on
the most probable category occurs due to the availability of categories in memory (Ross and
Murphy 1996) and the representativeness of such categories to guide subsequent probabilistic
inference (Lagnado and Shanks 2003). Further, Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, and Kunda (1983) also
argue for people‟s use of “intuitive, rule of thumb inferential procedures that resemble formal
statistical procedures. One example of such statistical heuristics is the preference for more rather
than less evidence. These studies, taken together, support the notion that uncertain consumers
may use simple judgments about probability while forming consideration sets and make
predictions about the quality of their decisions.
Formation of consideration set implies that the consumer will only consider a few
alternatives (typically a smaller subset) of all available alternatives. Thus, the majority of
alternatives will not be considered for further evaluation. Uncertain consumers will use this
majority of alternatives that will not be considered as the most probable category of reference for
probability judgment. The greater number of alternatives that will not be considered also
indicates more evidence for the most typical course of action and may guide subsequent
judgments. For example, if a consumer forms a consideration set of four alternatives from the
available ten alternatives, the chance that any given alternative will not be considered is 0.6 as
compared to it being considered (0.4). Exclusion, because of the higher probability may
15

represent the most typical and hence the most accurate course of action (Lagnado and Solomon
2004). Such probabilistic reasoning is especially beneficial to uncertain consumers to improve
their decision making. Therefore, highly uncertain consumers are more likely use to use
exclusion screening strategy.
In summary, evidence from these two lines of reasoning supports the proposed relationship
between uncertainty and the choice of screening strategy.

H1:

Uncertainty influences the choice of screening strategy such that; consumers with
high (low) levels of uncertainty are more likely to choose exclusion (inclusion) as
the preferred screening strategy to form consideration sets.

The previous discussion regarding the two lines of reasoning for the relationship between
perceived uncertainty and the choice of screening strategy suggests that consumers‟ perception
of accuracy achieved by the use of screening strategy drives the choice of screening strategy.
Specifically, the greater opportunities to learn increase the perceived accuracy that will be
achieved by the use of the screening strategy. Second, probabilistic reasoning increases the
perceived accuracy of the strategy by suggesting outcomes with higher probability as the most
typical and hence most accurate course of action. Thus, perceived accuracy of the screening
strategy drives the choice of the screening strategy. This is consistent with the notion that the
process of screening prevents bad options from entering the consideration set and thus increases
the opportunities to make higher quality decisions (Beach 1990, 1993; Beach and Mitchell 1987,
1990). Thus, the two lines of reasoning discussed earlier support the following hypothesis:
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H2:

Perceived accuracy of the screening strategy mediates the effect of uncertainty on
the choice of screening strategy.

2.4: Study 1
The objective of study 1 was to test whether the choice of screening strategy was
sensitive to consumers‟ perceived uncertainty. Decision makers‟ perceived uncertainty may
appear similar to their perception of how complex the task is to perform, (Schoemaker 2004).
These two related, but distinct concepts have been demonstrated to impact forecasting
(O‟Connor, Remus and Griggs 1993) and thus need to be discussed here. Task complexity is a
characteristic of the task at hand (Payne 1976; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993) such that
more complex tasks may be perceived as difficult. Whereas uncertainty is a characteristic of the
individual decision maker arising from the lack of knowledge to judge the alternatives, not
knowing which alternative to choose, or not knowing what decision rules are relevant
(Schoemaker 1993, 2004; Urbany, Dickson, and Wilkie 1989). Thus, it is important to
demonstrate the effects of uncertainty while controlling for complexity. To segregate the effects
of uncertainty and task complexity on the choice of screening strategies, I manipulated both
these variables in the same study. Uncertainty was manipulated by altering the knowledge and
understanding of the product category and preferences (Urbany, Dickson, and Wilkie 1989)
while task complexity was manipulated by varying the number of options available to choose
from (Payne 1976; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993). The reasoning was that increasing the
uncertainty that decision makers felt during the choice task should encourage them to choose
exclusion as the preferred screening strategy.
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2.4.1: Method
Thirty undergraduate students were recruited for the study. Participants were given extra
credit for their participation in the study. Adapting from Chakravarti and Janiszewski (2003),
participants were told that they would read some shopping scenarios regarding shopping for
videogames and were asked to think what the consumers would do if they were in the situation.
Participants were also asked to base their responses strictly on the information provided and
discount any previous experiences they may have had with the product category or specific
brands. The hypotheses were tested using a 2 (uncertainty: high or low) x 2 (task complexity:
high or low) x 4 (order of presentation) mixed design experiment. Here uncertainty and task
complexity were within-subject factors and order of presentation was a between-subjects factor.
In this study participants were told about four hypothetical consumers who were
shopping for videogames at different stores. Participants read the following scenario:
Imagine that four individual consumers (Aaron, Bob, Chris, and David) are out shopping
for video games at four different stores. At each store they find out that there are different
videogames. Each of them wants to form a smaller subset of 4 video games they want to
evaluate before making the final choice.
They can choose one of the following two methods to form a smaller subset of video
games they would like to consider further.
Inclusion – Look at all video games. Decide which videogames they WOULD
SERIOUSLY CONSIDER for purchase. Create a smaller subset of these 4 videogames.
Exclusion – Look at all video games. Decide which video games they WOULD NOT
SERIOUSLY CONSIDER for purchase. Create a smaller subset of the remaining 4
videogames.

At this point, participants were told about four different consumers who were either sure
or not sure of what videogames they were interested in. Uncertainty was manipulated by varying
the clarity of preferences and familiarity with the product. High uncertainty was created by
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telling participants that the consumer is not familiar with videogames and is not clear about what
he wants and he is not sure about what videogames he might be interested in. Low uncertainty
was created by telling participants that the consumer is familiar with videogames, is clear about
what he wants, and is very sure about what videogames he might be interested in. Task
complexity was manipulated by giving the consumer either 20 (high complexity condition) or 10
videogames (low complexity condition) to choose from.
Participants were told that the (hypothetical) consumer could form a smaller subset using
one of the two methods, inclusion or exclusion. Using inclusion method meant that the consumer
would look at all the videogames, decide which videogame he would seriously consider for
purchase and then create a smaller subset of these 4 videogames. Exclusion on the other hand
meant that the consumer would look at all videogames, decide which videogames he would not
seriously consider for purchase, and then create a smaller subset of the remaining 4 videogames.
After respondents read the shopping scenario, they were asked to indicate which
screening strategy the consumer was most likely to use for forming a smaller subset of
videogames. The dependent variable was thus, the likelihood that the consumer will use a
particular screening strategy to form the consideration set. The dependent variable was measured
for each consumer on an eight-point scale, where 1 indicated more likely to use inclusion and 8
indicated more likely to use exclusion. Finally, perceived accuracy was measured for each
consumer using a seven-point scale anchored by 1 = least accurate and 7 = most accurate.
Similarly, perceived effort was measured using a seven point scale anchored by 1 = least
effortful and 7 = most effortful.
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2.4.2: Results
Choice of screening strategy (H1). A mixed design ANOVA was performed to test the
effect of uncertainty and complexity on the choice of screening strategy with the order of
presentation as a between-subjects factor. The choice of screening strategy was not sensitive to
the order of presentation (F(3, 26) = 0.69, NS). Further, the order of presentation did not interact
with any other variables (all F‟s < 1). Next, I examined the effect of perceived uncertainty and
task complexity on the choice of screening strategy. The uncertainty manipulation significantly
influenced the choice of screening strategy (F(1, 26) = 14.43, p < .001). Consumers in the high
uncertainty condition were more likely to choose exclusion as the screening strategy (MHigh
Uncertainty

= 4.95) than those in the low uncertainty condition (Mlow uncertainty = 2.72). Task

complexity manipulation however, did not significantly influence the choice of screening
strategy (F(1, 26) = 2.36, NS, MHigh complexity = 4.11, MLow Complexity = 3.56). Further the interaction
of uncertainty and complexity was not significant (F(1, 26) = 2.36, NS). These results show that,
as hypothesized, uncertainty, and not task complexity influences the choice of screening strategy
while forming the consideration set, thus supporting H1.
Accuracy Considerations in the Choice of Screening Strategy (H2). To test the hypothesis
that consumers‟ considerations of accuracy of the screening strategy mediates the effect of
uncertainty on the choice of screening strategy, it needs to be shown that such accuracy
considerations drive the difference in the choice of screening strategy. I demonstrate this using
the three step procedure suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986).
The mediation analysis shows that in addition to the significant effect of uncertainty on
the choice of screening strategy as discussed earlier, uncertainty significantly influences
consumers‟ perception of accuracy (F(1, 25) = 8.99, p < .01). Finally, when accuracy is included
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in the model along with uncertainty, the effect of uncertainty on screening strategy becomes non
significant (F(1,24) = .97, NS), while the effect of accuracy considerations on the choice of
screening strategy is still significant (F(1,24) = 5.13, p < 0.05). Thus, accuracy consideration
receives support for the three criteria to demonstrate a mediating process. Further, to rule out an
alternate explanation of perceived effort mediating the perceived uncertainty – screening strategy
relationship, I used the same procedure suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986). Since perceived
uncertainty did not have a significant effect on the perceived effort (F(1,25) = 3.00, NS, it can be
concluded that effort considerations did not mediate the effect of uncertainty on the choice of
screening strategy. Thus, in support of the mediation hypothesis (H2), accuracy considerations
mediate the effect of uncertainty on the choice of screening strategy.

2.4.3: Discussion
The results of Study 1 are consistent with the hypothesis that the choice of screening
strategy is sensitive to uncertainty in the choice process. As uncertainty increases consumers are
more likely to screen alternatives using the exclusion strategy. Task complexity did not influence
the choice of screening strategy. Additionally, the choice of screening strategy is driven by the
accuracy considerations while making a choice.
The limitations of this study include the use of a within-subject task where participants
were exposed to all the levels of uncertainty and complexity. It can be argued that since the
differences in uncertainty and complexity across conditions are clearly evident to participants, it
might have prompted their choice of screening strategy. However, in a choice task seldom do
consumers actually know the level of uncertainty in relation to the other consumers or other
situations. Another limitation of this study stems from the design of the study. Participants were
21

asked to indicate what other hypothetical consumers would do if they were in a similar situation
(third person reference). It can be argued that participants‟ choice of screening strategy reflects
their prediction for the hypothetical consumer in the study and that when consumers have to
form a consideration set for themselves (first person reference) they may not be sensitive to
uncertainty or task complexity. I address these issues in study 2.

2.5: Study 2
To address the limitations arising in study 1 I conducted study 2, where participants
chose a screening strategy to form a consideration set for themselves in a between-subjects task.
In study 2, I predict that uncertain consumers are more likely to choose exclusion screening
strategy while task complexity will not influence the choice of screening strategy.

2.5.1: Method
One-hundred and twenty-six students from a large South-Eastern university participated
in this study. The experimental stimuli consisted of a decision making scenario where
participants were looking to rent an apartment. They had to screen the available alternatives and
form a consideration set of apartments they would like to consider for further evaluation. The
design was a 2 (uncertainty: high or low) x 2 (task complexity: high or low) between-subjects
experiment. In this study, participants were told to imagine that they are going to attend college
and they want to rent an apartment in the city. Perceived uncertainty was manipulated similar to
study 1. In addition, participants had to rent an apartment in a city that they were either familiar
with (low uncertainty condition) or unfamiliar with (high uncertainty condition). The task
complexity manipulation was identical to Study 1. Participants were asked to form a
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consideration set of four apartments from the either ten (low complexity) or twenty different
apartments (high complexity). A pretest (n = 66) was conducted to test the manipulation of task
complexity using a two- item seven-point semantic differential scale (anchored by not complex –
complex, not complicated – complicated). Results of the pretest showed that choosing from ten
available apartments was perceived as significantly less complex task (M = 3.91) than choosing
from twenty different apartments (M = 4.62), (F(1,64), = 4.31, p < .05). Thus, participants were
asked to read the following scenario:
Imagine that you are going to attend college in Orlando, Florida (Fairbanks, Alaska)
and you need to rent an apartment in the city. There are 10 (20) different apartments that
you can rent. You are (not) familiar with renting apartments in Orlando, Florida
(Fairbanks, Alaska) and are not clear about what you want. You are (not at all) sure
about the apartment you might be interested in.
Of the 10 (20) apartments that you can rent, you want to form a smaller subset of 4
apartments you would like to evaluate further before making the final choice.
You can choose one of the following two methods to form a smaller subset of apartments
you would like to consider further.
Inclusion – Look at all apartments. Decide which apartments you WOULD SERIOUSLY
CONSIDER for renting. Create a smaller subset of these 4 apartments.
Exclusion – Look at all apartments. Decide which apartments you WOULD NOT
SERIOUSLY CONSIDER for renting. Create a smaller subset of the remaining 4
apartments.
The experimental procedure was similar to that of Study 1. After reading the decision
scenario, participants could form a smaller subset of apartments for further evaluation using
either the exclusion or inclusion strategy. Instructions for exclusion and inclusion strategies were
identical to those of Study 1. Participants were then asked to indicate which strategy they were
most likely to use to form the smaller subset of apartments for further evaluation. Like Study 1,
the dependent variable was participants‟ likelihood of using the screening strategy, measured on
a eight-point scale where 1 indicated more likely to use inclusion and 8 indicated more likely to
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use exclusion. Next, participants‟ accuracy and effort considerations were measured using the
same scales as used in Study 1. Finally, uncertainty in choosing a rental apartment was measured
by two-item, seven-point semantic differential scale (anchored by unsure – sure; uncertain –
certain).

2.5.2: Results
The manipulation check verified that there was a significant difference in participants‟
perceived uncertainty across the two levels of uncertainty manipulated in the study. Participants
who were choosing a rental apartment in a familiar city were less uncertain (MLow Uncertainty =
2.32) as compared to those who were choosing a rental apartment in an unfamiliar city (MHigh
Uncertainty =

3.30, F(1, 122) = 18.14, p < .001).

Choice of screening strategy (H1). A two-way ANOVA was performed to test the effect
of uncertainty and complexity on the choice of screening strategy. Results were consistent with
H1 and showed that the uncertainty manipulation significantly influenced the choice of screening
strategy (F(1, 122) = 5.40, p < .05). Consumers in the high uncertainty condition were more
likely to choose exclusion as the screening strategy (MHigh Uncertainty = 4.25) than those in the low
uncertainty condition (Mlow uncertainty = 3.21). Task complexity manipulation however, did not
significantly influence the choice of screening strategy (F(1, 122) = .77, NS). Further, the
interaction of uncertainty and task complexity was not significant (F(1, 122) = .24, NS). These
results show that, as hypothesized, uncertainty and not task complexity influences the choice of
screening strategy in forming the consideration set and thereby provide robust support for the
results from Study 1.

24

---------------------------------------------------------Insert figure 2.1 about here
----------------------------------------------------------

Accuracy Considerations in the Choice of Screening Strategy (H2). As in Study 1, I tested
the mediating effect of accuracy considerations on the relationship between uncertainty and the
choice of screening strategy. I used the three step procedure suggested by Baron and Kenny
(1986) as detailed in study 1. In addition to the significant influence of perceived uncertainty on
the choice of screening strategy, as discussed earlier, it also significantly affected consumers‟
consideration of accuracy of the screening strategy (F(1, 122) = 4.61, p < .05). When accuracy is
included in the model along with uncertainty and task complexity, the effect of uncertainty on
screening strategy becomes non significant (F(1, 121) = 2.74, NS), while the effect of accuracy
considerations on the choice of screening strategy is still significant (F(1, 121) = 16.02, p <
0.001). Thus, accuracy consideration receives support for the three criteria to demonstrate a
mediating process. Thus, in support of H2, accuracy consideration mediates the effect of
uncertainty on the choice of screening strategy. Further, similar to Study 1, effort considerations
did not receive support for the mediating role on the relationship between perceived accuracy
and screening strategy. Although, perceived uncertainty significantly influenced the choice of
screening strategy (F(1, 122) = 5.40, p < .05), it did not significantly influence effort
considerations (F(1, 122) = .16, NS)
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2.5.3: Discussion
The results of the study are consistent with the hypothesis that the choice of screening
strategy is sensitive to uncertainty in the choice process. As uncertainty increases, consumers are
more likely to screen alternatives using the exclusion strategy. Task complexity, however, did
not influence the choice of screening strategy. Additionally, the choice of screening strategy is
driven by the accuracy considerations relating to the screening strategy while making a choice. I
find that this relationship holds even when consumers have to choose a screening strategy for
themselves as well as when they predict the choice of a screening strategy for a hypothetical
consumer. Second, I demonstrated that the pattern of results is similar even when the uncertainty
manipulation was subtle and the difference in uncertainty levels across conditions was not
evident to the participant (Figure 1). Thus, I demonstrated that the limitations discussed in study
1 cannot explain the relationship between uncertainty and screening strategy.
Studies 1 and 2 show that highly uncertain consumers are more likely to choose exclusion
screening strategy because they perceive that the use of exclusion strategy will lead to more
accurate decisions. The mediating role of perceived accuracy has received strong support in both
studies 1 and 2. In both these studies, the mediating role of perceived accuracy was demonstrated
through measurement-of-mediation design (Spencer, Zanna, and Fong 2005), where the
underlying psychological process of perceived accuracy was measured and then subjected to a
mediation test procedure proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986). Another approach to
demonstrate the mediating effect is to utilize a moderation analysis and experimentally
manipulate the proposed psychological process (Spencer, Zanna, and Fong 2005). I propose that
the mediator in this research, perceptions of accuracy, may be susceptible to the characteristics of
the task at hand. The number of options consumers consider for further evaluation (consideration
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set size) is one such task characteristic that may influence the uncertainty-screening strategy
relationship. Next, I will argue how consideration set size will moderate the uncertaintyscreening strategy relationship demonstrated earlier.

2.6: The Moderating Role of Consideration Set Size
The psychological process underlying the relationship between an independent and
dependent variable can be tested in one of two ways: 1) by measuring the mediator and
statistically testing the role of mediator using the Baron and Kenny (1986) procedure (also
called measurement-of-mediation design); and 2) by experimentally manipulating the proposed
process (also called moderation-of-process design) (Spencer, Zanna , and Fong 2005). The later
method has been argued to provide strong demonstration of the underlying psychological process
by utilizing the power of experiments to demonstrate causality (Spencer, Zanna , and Fong
2005). While I demonstrated the underlying mechanism in Studies 1 and 2 through the
measurement-of-mediation design, here I will use the moderation-of-process design to establish
the underlying psychological process. I argue that consideration set size will moderate the
relationship between uncertainty and screening strategy by influencing the perceived accuracy of
the screening strategy. The use of consideration set size to vary the underlying psychological
process adheres to the idea of minimal manipulation in psychology (Prentice and Miller 1992)
since an alteration in just the number of alternatives in the consideration set is proposed to
significantly alter the underlying psychological process.
The number of alternatives that consumers consider for further evaluation, called the
consideration set size, is an important descriptive characteristic of the consideration set (Desai
and Hoyer 2000). Consideration set size is conceptually distinct from the total number of
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alternatives available to choose from (complexity). While complexity (discussed in Studies 1 and
2) related to the number of alternatives available to choose from, consideration set size refers to
the number of alternatives that the consumer considers for further evaluation. Further discussion
of consideration set size assumes a constant number of alternatives to choose from.
Extant literature has typically viewed the consideration set size as an outcome of the
screening strategy selected. A common finding is that sets created by using exclusion are
systematically larger than those created by inclusion (Levin, Jasper, and Forbes 1998; Levin,
Huneke, and Jasper 2000; Yaniv and Schul 1997, 2000). However, the number of alternatives a
consumer chooses can be argued to be an integral characteristic of the task at hand. Task
characteristics have been shown to influence decision making and forecasting (Beach, Barnes,
and Christensen-Szalanski 1986; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993).
The number of options that consumers have to choose from provides frames that they use
to view and represent the problem (Shafir 1993). Shafir (1993) demonstrated that when a
majority of options (e.g. five of six) are to be chosen the task is represented as choosing one,
while the task of rejecting a majority of options (e.g. five of six) is also seen similarly as
choosing one alternative. Support for this proposition was further advanced by Abdul-Muhmin
(1999), who demonstrated that participants instructed to choose three or seven options (of ten
available options) searched for similar amounts of the available information and those instructed
to choose five options searched for less of the available information. Since forming a
consideration set is a stage in the decision making process it is reasonable to assume that such
task frames will also influence the process by which the consideration set itself is formed. I
propose that the consideration set size (number of options to choose) will interact with the
uncertainty consumers face during decision making to influence the choice of screening strategy.
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This is supported by the two lines of reasoning discussed earlier, learning and probabilistic
reasoning.
As discussed earlier, when consumers consider only a small proportion of all available
alternatives (e.g. four of ten) then use of exclusion screening strategy will viewed as making
significantly more number of decisions, thus providing more opportunities to learn. However,
when consumers form larger consideration set (e.g. six of ten) then inclusion will be viewed as
making more number of decisions instead and thus providing more opportunities to learn. Such
learning is especially beneficial to uncertain consumers who are more likely to now use inclusion
screening strategy.
Consideration set size also influences the probability of what appears to be the typical
and hence accurate response. When consideration sets contain a smaller proportion of all
available alternatives, majority of the options will not be considered for evaluation and this
category of options seem to be the most probable category. However, when consumers will form
larger consideration sets, where a greater proportion of available alternatives will be considered
for further evaluation, the most probable category is that the option will be considered. Highly
uncertain consumers are more likely to use the category with higher probability as the most
representative and hence most accurate path to screening. For example, uncertain consumers who
form a consideration set of four alternatives (out of the 10 available alternatives) will choose
exclusion as the screening strategy since the probability that an alternative will not be considered
is higher (0.6) as compared to it being considered (0.4). However, when the task involves
forming a consideration set of six alternatives (from ten available alternatives), the probability
that an alternative will be considered is higher (0.6) as compared to it not being considered (0.4).
Highly uncertain consumers who are not sure of their preferences and/or how to choose are more
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likely to use the higher probability (0.6) as an indicator to the natural response that will yield a
more accurate choice. Such accuracy considerations will lead highly uncertain decision makers
to choose inclusion as the preferred screening strategy in the choice task that involves forming a
larger consideration set.
H3:

Consideration set size moderates the effect of uncertainty on the choice of
screening strategy such that, when forming smaller consideration sets consumers
with high (low) levels of uncertainty are more likely to choose exclusion
(inclusion); whereas when forming larger sets consumers with high (low)
uncertainty are more likely to choose inclusion (exclusion) as the preferred
screening strategy to form consideration sets.

2.7: Study 3
The previous two studies demonstrated that consumers‟ choice of screening strategy is
sensitive to how uncertain consumers felt during the choice task. The objective of this study is to
show that for highly uncertain decision makers, the choice of screening strategy is sensitive to
the size of the consideration set. As done by Shafir (1993), size of the consideration set will be
manipulated by altering how many of the total available alternatives will be considered for
further evaluation. Here it must be noted that the larger consideration set must consist of
alternatives greater than half of the available alternatives and the smaller set must consist of
alternatives less than half of the total number of available alternatives.
As in the previous studies, uncertainty will be manipulated by altering the knowledge and
understanding of the product category and specific preferences (Urbany, Dickson, and Wilkie
1989). The number of available alternatives to choose from is the same across different
conditions.
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2.7.1: Method
One hundred and twenty-two participants were recruited for this study from a large
South-Eastern university. The hypothesis was tested using a 2 (uncertainty: high or low) x 2
(consideration set size: large or small) between-subjects experiment. The experimental stimuli
consisted of a decision making scenario as in study 2, where respondents were told that they are
looking to rent an apartment and had to screen the available alternatives to form a consideration
set of apartments they would like to consider for further evaluation. Uncertainty manipulations
were exactly identical to those used in Study 2. Participants in the high uncertainty condition
were told that they are renting an apartment in a city they are unfamiliar with and they are not
sure about what they want or the kind of apartment they might be interested in. Participants in
the low uncertainty conditions were told that they want to rent an apartment in a city they were
familiar with and are sure about what they want and the kind of apartment they might be
interested in. Consideration set size was altered by asking participants to form a larger
consideration set of sixteen or a smaller set of four apartments out of the same available twenty
apartments.
The experimental procedures were similar to those used in Studies 1 and 2. After reading
the decision scenario, participants could form a smaller subset of apartments for further
evaluation using either the exclusion or inclusion strategy. Instructions for exclusion and
inclusion strategies were similar to those in previous studies. Participants were asked to indicate
which strategy they are most likely to use to form a smaller subset of apartments for further
evaluation. The dependent variable was participants‟ likelihood of using the screening strategy
measured on an eight-point scale. Accuracy considerations were measured using the same scales
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as used in study 2. Finally, perceived uncertainty in choosing a rental apartment was measured
by two-item, seven-point semantic differential scale as in Study 2.

2.7.2: Results
The manipulation check verified that there was a significant difference in participants‟
perceived uncertainty across the two levels of uncertainty manipulated in the study. Participants
who were choosing a rental apartment in a familiar city were less uncertain (MLow Uncertainty =
2.34) as compared to those who were choosing a rental apartment in an unfamiliar city (MHigh
Uncertainty =

3.50, F(1, 118) = 24.97, p < .001). Further, there was no main effect of consideration

set size, nor the interaction between uncertainty and consideration set size (F‟s < 1).
Choice of screening strategy (H3). A two-way ANOVA was performed to test the effect
of uncertainty and set size on the choice of screening strategy. First, there was no significant
main effect for either perceived uncertainty (F(1, 118) = .05, NS) or consideration set size (F (1,
118) = 1.63, NS). Second, results were consistent with the hypothesis and showed that the
interaction of uncertainty and set size was significant (F(1, 118) = 8.79, p < .01).Consumers in
the low uncertainty condition that formed a smaller set were more likely to use inclusion (MLow
Uncertainty / small set =

3.21) as compared to those in the high uncertainty condition forming a smaller

set (MHigh Uncertainty / small set = 4.62) (F(1, 118) = 76.47, p < 0.01). This is consistent with findings
from studies 1 and 2. Further, consumers in the low uncertainty condition when formed a larger
set, were more likely to choose exclusion as the screening strategy (MLow Uncertainty / Large set = 5.09)
than those in the high uncertainty condition and forming a larger set (MHigh Uncertainty / Large set =
3.87) (F(1, 118) = 110.01, p < 0.01). These results show that, when faced with high uncertainty
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and forming larger consideration sets consumers are more likely to choose inclusion screening
strategy, thus supporting H3.

---------------------------------------------------------Insert figure 2.2 about here
----------------------------------------------------------

2.7.3: Discussion
The results of Study 3 were consistent with the hypothesis that whereas uncertain
consumers forming smaller consideration sets were more likely to use exclusion as the preferred
screening strategy, they were more likely to use inclusion while forming larger consideration sets
(Figure 2). This result is important in demonstrating the underlying mechanism as suggested by
Spencer, Zanna , and Fong (2005) and validate the results found earlier in Studies 1 and 2.

2.8: Study 4
The three studies reported here provide strong support to the relationship between
uncertainty and choice of screening strategy. While studies 1 and 2 demonstrate this relationship
along with the underlying psychological mechanism, study 3 shows that this relationship will flip
when consumers form large consideration sets. Whereas these results were demonstrated in
internally valid laboratory experiments, demonstrating this relationship in an ecologically valid
real life decision making situation will contribute to better understanding of this relationship
(Winer 1999). Thus, the objective of Study 4 was to test the relationship between uncertainty and
the choice of screening strategy using data from real-life decision making scenarios.
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2.8.1: Who wants to be a Millionaire? game show
Study 4 used data from the TV show Who Wants to be a Millionaire?. Data from such
natural experiments have been used to investigate decision behavior under conditions of
uncertainty and risk (e.g. Gertner 1993; Metrick 1995; He, Inman, and Mittal 2008). The TV
show Who Wants to be a Millionaire? not only provides an ecologically valid decision making
situation, but is also incentive compatible as contestants receive cash prize for their performance
on the show. Contestants may answer up to 15 questions to earn up to maximum prize money of
$1,000,000 with questions ranging in value from $100 to $1,000,000. Contestants can advance to
the next question only if they answer the previous question correctly.
Each question has 4 possible answers and contestants have to choose the answer which
they think may be the correct answer. Each contestant also has the option to seek help from
“lifelines” like polling the audience, asking for random elimination of two incorrect responses,
calling a friend for help with answering the question, and switching the question with another
question worth the same dollar value. Each lifeline can be used only once, although multiple
lifelines can be used to answer any one question. Contestants remain in the show until they can
answer questions correctly and receive the cash prize equivalent to their last correct response.

2.8.2: Method
Data. Data were collected by recording 24 episodes of Who Wants to be a Millionaire?
that were broadcast on ABC television between May and June 2007. The shows were then
transcribed to text by extracting closed captions from the recorded shows. The show format
allows contestants to verbalize their thoughts as they go through the decision making process and
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all such verbalizations were recorded and transcribed. Consistent with the recommendations of
Ericsson and Simon (1993), all information (including pauses and any expressions the
contestants made) were transcribed and retained in the transcript. These verbalized thoughts were
then subjected to verbal protocol analysis (Ericsson and Simon 1993).
Forty-one adult contestants participated in the 24 shows used in the study (males = 20).
In all, contestants were asked 419 questions. Of these, 140 questions were selected for verbal
protocol analysis using the following three criteria. First, only questions where contestants
verbalized their thoughts were used for further analysis as only such questions were deemed
meaningful for verbal protocol analysis. Second, for questions where contestants used a
“lifeline”, thoughts that were verbalized only before the use of lifeline were used for the analysis.
Thoughts that were generated before using “lifelines” are independently generated by the
contestant and are thus suitable for the analysis. Third, only questions where contestants made a
choice for the final answer were used for further analysis. Questions that met these three criteria
were selected and subjected to further analysis.
All the verbalized thoughts were coded by two independent coders blind to the
hypotheses. The coders were trained to use the coding procedure using transcripts from a show
that were not part of the data. Coders followed a two step coding procedure for the verbal
protocol analysis. First, coders segmented all the verbalized thoughts into distinct thoughts that
were meaningful and conceptually independent. Each segment thus represented one instance of a
general process or a separate idea (Ericsson and Simon 1993). This is an important step to ensure
objectivity in the subsequent steps. The inter-coder reliability for this step was 0.83. All
disagreements were resolved by discussion between the two coders. Next, coders encoded each
segment into one of five categories uncertainty, certainty, inclusion, exclusion, or others. To
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keep the range of context used in the coding as narrow as possible, coders were instructed to
encode the segments based on the information contained in the segment itself (Ericsson and
Simon 1993). Some examples of verbalized uncertainty are “I don‟t have a clue. Don‟t even have
a guess”, “I have no idea”, and “I am not sure of anything”. Examples of contestants‟
verbalization of certainty were “I have heard of this before”, “Oh my God, I think I know this”,
“Yeah yeah, I am pretty sure”. Verbalizations of inclusion included among others “Its “A,” Paul
Bunyan, final answer” and “You know, I am going to go with “B” playground”. Instances of
verbalizations of exclusion included “A whale doesn‟t transport [contraband], a tiger doesn‟t
transport [contraband], and neither does the fox”. The inter-coder reliability for this step of
encoding segments into categories was 0.88. All disagreements were resolved by discussion
between the coders.
Dependent Variable. The dependent variable was the extent of use of inclusion or
exclusion as the screening strategy (Strategy). For each question, choice of screening strategy
was operationalized by computing the difference between the number of instances of exclusion
and inclusion. Higher scores indicated greater use of exclusion screening strategy by the
contestant.
Independent Variable. The independent variable was the degree of uncertainty that
contestants verbalized for each question in the show (Uncer). For each question, uncertainty was
operationalized by computing the difference between the total number of thoughts that reflected
uncertainty and total number of thoughts that reflected certainty. Higher scores indicated that the
contestant was more uncertain during the choice process.
Control Variables. Whether contestants used lifelines or not was recorded as a dummy
variable (Lifeline). Additionally, the dollar value of the question was recorded and coded as low,
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medium, or high. The total of 15 questions were grouped into three sets of five questions each.
Questions that were worth $100 - $1,000 were coded as Dlow, questions from $2,000 - $25,000
were coded as DMedium, and those greater than $25,000 were coded as DHigh. Further, withincontestant correlations were accounted for by the variable Resp. The following regression model
was used for analysis:
Strategy = β0 + β1 Uncer + β2 Lifeline + β3 DLow + β4 DMedium + ε ……………. (1)

2.8.3: Results
Data were analyzed using the regression model explained above. First, the model was
estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. The dependent variable used for this
analysis was the choice of screening strategy (Strategy). As expected, contestant‟s perceived
uncertainty had a significant impact on the choice of screening strategy such that when
contestants perceived higher uncertainty in the choice process they were more likely to use
exclusion screening strategy (b = .05, p < .05). Among the control variables in the model,
Lifeline was significant (b = .23, p < .05) indicating the preference for exclusion screening
strategy when contestants used lifelines. Further, DLow (b = .28, p <.05), and DMedium (b = .31,
p < .05) were both statistically significant.
An important aspect of the game was that the same contestant answered multiple
questions during the game. Thus, it is possible that the choice of screening strategy for these
questions may be correlated because of individual-specific factors. Failure to account for
contestant-specific correlations in the analysis may lead to biased estimates of regression
coefficients and incorrect inferences about the regression estimates (Diggle, Heagerty, Liang,
and Zeger 2002). Therefore, I estimated the OLS model incorporating the contestant-specific
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correlations (Resp). Analysis of the data by random effects regression shows that contestant‟s
perceived uncertainty had a significant impact on the choice of screening strategy such that when
contestants perceived higher uncertainty in the choice process they were more likely to use
exclusion screening strategy (b = .05, p < .05)1. An interesting finding is that among the control
variables in the random effects model, only DMedium (b = .31, p < .05) was statistical
significant. However, Lifeline and DLow did not reach statistical significance. Thus, regardless
of whether the model accounted for contestant-specific correlations, the choice of screening
strategy was influenced by contestant‟s perceived uncertainty (Table 1). This illustrates that
within-contestant correlations cannot account for the effect of uncertainty. Therefore, these
results not only replicate findings from Studies 1, 2, and 3, but also lend robustness to the
inference regarding the role of uncertainty on the choice of screening strategy.

---------------------------------------------------------Insert table 2.1 about here
----------------------------------------------------------

2.8.4: Discussion
Results of study 4 lend support for the relationship between uncertainty and screening
strategy in ecologically valid context using data from a TV game show. Thus, I demonstrate that
1

An alternate analysis with discrete dependent variable produced similar results. The alternate
dependent variable (Strategy1) was created by coding the choice of screening strategy as either
inclusion or exclusion. If the difference between the number of instances of exclusion and
inclusion was negative the choice of screening strategy was coded as exclusion, otherwise it was
coded as inclusion. The model specification for logit analysis was: Strategy1 = β0 + β1 Uncer +
β2 Lifeline + ε. The dummies for the dollar value of the question were dropped from the model to
correct for inflated standard errors. Further, the mixed-logit model accounting for contestantspecific correlations in the analysis also produced similar results.
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even in a natural decision making situation like choosing one answer from multiple alternatives
as in the game show, when contestants were highly uncertain they were more likely to use
exclusion screening strategy. This finding not only replicates but also validates earlier findings
from the experimental studies (Studies 1 and 2).

2.9: General Discussion

2.9.1: Theoretical Contributions
Screening alternatives to form consideration sets is an important stage in the choice
process. Screening influences not only what options will be considered for choice by determining
the contents of the consideration set (Heller, Levin, and Goransson 2002; Yaniv and Schul 1997,
2000), but also influences the nature of final choice (Chakravarti, Janiszewski, and Ulkumen
2006). The two screening strategies used; inclusion and exclusion; operate by different
psychological processes and produce differential outcomes (Yaniv and Schul 1997, 2000). Thus,
it is imperative to understand when and why consumers will choose one screening strategy over
the other.
This paper was motivated by the belief that individual characteristics of the decision
maker not only influence the final choice (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993), but also the
choice of screening strategy to form consideration sets. In this paper, I examined the role of
consumers‟ perceived uncertainty on the choice of screening strategy. Perceived uncertainty is an
important characteristic of the individual decision maker and is prevalent in most routine
decision making situations. For example, when consumers choose from a number of available
options, they may be uncertain about the benefits of the various options, the importance of
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specific attributes, or simply how to choose. Such uncertainties have a profound impact on the
decision process and the final choice as well (Jacoby et al. 1994; Kahn and Meyer 1991; Tversky
and Kahneman 1974).
Studies 1 and 2 in this paper provide support to the hypothesis that when consumers face
high levels of uncertainty in the choice process, they will use exclusion screening strategy to
screen alternatives. This finding is important from a theoretical perspective for two reasons.
First, it furthers existing literature in screening strategies by demonstrating conditions under
which one screening strategy may be chosen over the other. Second, this finding highlights the
critical role of perceived uncertainty in the choice process. While the impact of perceived
uncertainty on choice of decision heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman 1974), assignment of
attribute weights (Kahn and Meyer 1991), and information search strategies (Jacoby et al. 1994)
have been researched to a great extent, its impact on screening strategy has not received much
attention. By demonstrating the impact of perceived uncertainty on the choice of screening
strategies, this research underscores the effects of such perceived uncertainty on the stages of
decision making preceding the final choice; i.e. screening alternatives and forming consideration
sets. Further, I also demonstrated this relationship in an ecologically valid decision making
scenario. The impact of uncertainty on the choice of screening strategy is robust across different
product categories (decision making scenarios) (videogames, apartment rental, and game shows),
types of data (experimental and non-experimental), research designs (within-subject and
between-subjects), and analysis tools employed (ANOVA, OLS, random effects regression,
Logit, and mixed-Logit models). Finally, Generalization of the findings across a variety of
decision tasks and scenarios further emphasizes the far reaching impact of perceived uncertainty
on decision making, one that may have implications for the well being of the decision makers.
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While results for the impact of perceived uncertainty on the choice of screening strategy
was robust across the studies presented in this paper, the choice of screening strategy was not
sensitive to the number of alternatives to choose from. In this paper, I have manipulated
uncertainty and task complexity independently and have thus disentangled the effect of each on
the choice of screening strategy. First, from a theoretical perspective it is consistent with Payne,
Bettman, and Johnson‟s (1993) notion that the decision problem characteristics (task and
context) and the decision maker‟s characteristics interact to influence decision behavior. Since
task complexity is a task characteristic and perceived uncertainty is a characteristic of the
individual decision maker, they may have differential impact on decision behavior, including the
choice of screening strategy to form consideration sets. Also, the finding that the choice of
screening strategy is not as sensitive to task complexity implies that although task difficulty and
task complexity are related constructs, the use of one or the other interchangeably to investigate
decision behavior may lead to erroneous conclusions. Again, this is in line with Schoemaker‟s
(2004) argument for the need to investigate the independent effects of these two related but
distinct concepts.
Another important finding from this research is that consumers‟ choice of screening
strategy is driven by their accuracy considerations. This means that consumers choose the
screening strategy that will increase the perceived accuracy of their choice. Uncertain consumers
think that the accuracy of their choice using exclusion screening strategy will be higher than had
they chosen inclusion. This is an important finding that extends the notion that screening is
primarily driven by the motivation to prevent bad options from entering the consideration set
(Beach 1990, 1993; Beach and Mitchell 1987, 1990). Thus, to the extent that consumers form a
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“good” consideration set they are more likely to make a good choice in the second stage of the
choice process.
While perceived accuracy drives the choice of screening strategy, what appears to be
more accurate strategy can be influenced by the nature of the decision task itself. For instance,
results of Study 3 showed that when uncertain consumers form larger consideration sets, the
relationship between perceived uncertainty and screening strategy flips such that; uncertain
consumers choose inclusion screening strategy instead. This finding provides an important test of
theory by explicating a boundary condition that reverses the relationship between uncertainty and
choice of screening strategy. Thus the choice of screening strategy is malleable in nature and
conforms to the adaptive decision making framework suggested by Payne, Bettman, and Johnson
(1993).

2.9.2: Managerial Implications
The finding that the choice of screening strategy is sensitive to perceived uncertainty and
not task complexity is relevant from a managerial perspective. It implies that consumers weigh in
their perception of uncertainty much higher than how many alternatives they have to choose
from. Thus, if a firm wants a brand to be included in the consideration set because of its
superiority on a particular attribute, it should focus on reducing consumers‟ perceived
uncertainty regarding the attribute and its importance in the performance of the brand. Such
reduced uncertainty would mean that consumers would use that attribute to screen alternatives
and include all the alternatives that match the cutoff on that attribute. The screening strategy
consumers use to form consideration sets will have more serious implications for a brand that is
not clearly superior or inferior on all the attributes (Yaniv and Schul 2000) and for such brands
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to be included in the consideration set, firms have to reduce the perceived uncertainty for that
brand on some important attribute. These findings also provide managers valuable insights on
how consumers choose screening strategies and form consideration sets.

2.9.3: Limitations and Future Research
Although this dissertation contributes to literatures in screening strategies and uncertainty
in decision making it is not without limitations. While the impact of uncertainty on the choice of
screening strategy is robust across three experimental studies and across different product
categories (videogames and apartments), the experiments primarily used hypothetical decision
scenarios as the experimental set-up. Yet, it will be interesting to test these predictions using an
actual choice set-up where consumers will actually screen alternatives and form consideration
sets. Such a study will enhance the ecological validity of the findings reported in this paper.
While this paper has highlighted the role of perceived accuracy as the primary driver of
the relationship between perceived uncertainty and the choice of screening strategy, it is not clear
whether the use of the strategy will actually improve decision accuracy. For instance, do highly
uncertain consumers make objectively better decisions by using exclusion strategy as they
anticipate? Future research needs to address whether consumers‟ perceived accuracy matches the
objective accuracy of decisions.
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Table 2. 1: Study 4 – The Role of Perceived Uncertainty on Contestants‟ Choice of
Screening Strategy in Who Wants to be a Millionaire? a

OLS Regression (n = 140)

Random Effects Regression (n = 40)

Variable

Coefficient

Standard Error

Coefficient

Standard Error

Uncertainty

.05**

.03

.05**

.03

Lifeline

.23**

.14

.24

.17

DLow

.28**

.14

.27

.18

DMedium

.31**

.13

.31**

.17

Constant

-1.27***

.12

-1.26***

.15

Overall R2

.07

.07

Sigma_u

-

.23

Sigma_e

-

.52

Rho

-

.16

a

Results are based on two-tailed tests
** p < .05; *** p < .001
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Low Uncertainty

6

High Uncertainty

4.95

Screening Strategy

5

4.25
4
3.21
3

2.72

2
1
Study 1: Videogame

Study 2: Apartment Rental

Figure 2.1: Studies 1 and 2 – The Effect of Uncertainty and Complexity on Choice
of Screening Strategy
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Low Uncertainty

6

High Uncertainty

5.09
Screening Strategy

5

4.62
3.87

4
3.21
3
2
1
Small Consideration Set

Large Consideration Set

Figure 2.2: Study 3 – The Interactive Effect of Uncertainty and Consideration Set
Size on Choice of Screening Strategy
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CHAPTER THREE: THE ROLES OF PERCEIVED UNCERTAINTY,
SCREENING STRATEGIES, AND CONSIDERATION SET SIZE ON
OBJECTIVE DECISION ACCURACY
3.1: Abstract
Consumers screen from all available alternatives using one of two ways: an exclusion
screening strategy wherein alternatives not worthy of further consideration are rejected or an
inclusion strategy wherein worthy alternatives are selected for further evaluation. This paper
investigates the role of perceived uncertainty and consideration set size on the relationship
between screening strategy and objective accuracy of decision. Utilizing an experimental study
with an actual choice task, I demonstrate that perceived uncertainty moderates the screening
strategy-decision accuracy relationship. Further, this interactive relationship is contingent on
consideration set sizes. Whereas consumers with high perceived uncertainty make higher quality
decisions with inclusion while forming smaller consideration sets, their decision quality is higher
with exclusion when forming larger sets. Likewise, while consumers with low perceived
uncertainty make more accurate decisions with exclusion when forming smaller sets, the
accuracy of their decisions increases with inclusion when forming larger sets.

3.2: Introduction
Consumers screen from all available alternatives (Beach 1990; 1993) and consider a
smaller subset of alternatives for further evaluation, called the consideration set (Bettman 1979;
Nedungadi 1990). Two types of screening strategies are commonly utilized by consumers to
form consideration sets: an exclusion strategy wherein alternatives not worthy of further
consideration are eliminated and an inclusion strategy wherein worthy alternatives are included
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into the consideration set (e.g. Yaniv and Schul 1997; 2000). Despite the understanding that an
important motivation for consumers to engage in screening is to search and choose the best
option (Beach 1990, 1993; Beach and Mitchell 1990), there is limited understanding of the
consequences of the screening strategy on decision quality. This paper attempts to fill the void by
investigating how screening strategies impact decision quality and the factors that impact this
relationship.
Two outcomes of using the screening strategy that have been investigated are the number
of alternatives considered (consideration set size) and the quality or accuracy of the decision
(Heller, Levin, and Goransson 2002; Levin et al. 2001; Yaniv and Schul 1997, 2000). Evidence
for the impact of the screening strategy on the size of consideration set is robust, such that sets
created by exclusion screening strategy are significantly larger than those created by inclusion
(Heller, Levin, and Goransson 2002; Levin et al. 2001; Yaniv and Schul 1997, 2000). However,
there is little consensus about the impact of the screening strategy on decision quality. These
studies demonstrated that consideration sets created by exclusion strategy are more accurate, but
only when the consideration set size is not taken into account. Accuracy in these studies was
defined by the outcome of the screening strategy (i.e. the percentage of sets that contain the
correct answer). This view of accuracy does not investigate the impact of screening strategies for
the objective accuracy of the final choice. This view also ignores the idea that under some
conditions one screening strategy may yield decisions with higher accuracy as compared to using
the other strategy. For example, it was shown in essay 1 that perceived uncertainty impacts the
preference for one screening strategy versus the other. However, both highly uncertain and less
uncertain consumers choose the screening strategy based on the perceived accuracy of the
strategy and are motivated to make accurate decisions. Thus, the objective accuracy of the
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decision should be analyzed in terms of the ability of the screening strategy to improve the
likelihood of making a good decision, especially given the level of uncertainty consumers
perceive during the choice process.
In this paper, I argue that highly uncertain consumers who use inclusion screening
strategy make more accurate decisions and consumers with low perceived uncertainty are better
off using exclusion screening strategy. I draw upon the literature on information search in
decision making (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993) to suggest that the greater search for
information when using inclusion screening strategy, while assisting highly uncertain consumers
to make decisions of higher objective accuracy, will hurt consumers with low perceived
uncertainty by reducing the objective accuracy of their decision. Furthermore, I argue for an
interesting reversal of this interactive effect when consideration set sizes are varied. I show that
when consumers form larger consideration sets, highly uncertain consumers are better off using
exclusion screening strategy (as opposed to inclusion) and consumers with low perceived
uncertainty make decisions with higher objective accuracy if they use inclusion screening
strategy (as opposed to exclusion).
I test this hypothesis in an experimental study. I demonstrate the interactive effect of
perceived uncertainty and screening strategy on objective decision accuracy using an actual
choice task. Further, I show the reversal of the interactive effect of perceived uncertainty and
screening strategies on decision accuracy for large consideration sets. Results are generally
supportive of the predictions.
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3.3: Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses

3.3.1: Screening Strategies and Decision Accuracy
When choosing from a number of available alternatives, consumers form a smaller set of
alternatives called the consideration set from which they make the final choice (Bettman 1979;
Nedungadi 1990). The process of narrowing down the number of alternatives they will finally
consider is called screening (Beach 1990, 1993) and can be achieved by a rejection-based or a
selection-based screening strategy. In a selection-based screening strategy, called inclusion,
alternatives that meet the predetermined criteria are retained in the consideration set. In a
rejection-based screening strategy, called exclusion, alternatives that do not meet the
predetermined criteria are screened out from further consideration (see Yaniv and Schul 1997;
2000 for a review). In the case of inclusion, consumers have to decide whether each alternative
should be seriously considered for the final choice. In the case of exclusion consumers have to
decide for each alternative, whether that alternative should be dropped from further consideration
(Heller, Levin, and Goransson 2002).
The process of screening prevents bad options from being considered and as such it is
driven by the motivation to search for and ultimately choose the best option (Beach 1990, 1993;
Beach and Mitchell 1990). Thus, an important consequence of the act of screening is that it
actively increases the likelihood of a better decision by preventing bad options from being
considered (Beach 1993).
The quality of decisions is an important consequence of the screening strategy. Screening
strategies can be thought of impacting two types of decision accuracies: (1) accuracy of the
consideration set, and (2) accuracy of the final choice. Accuracy of the consideration sets refers
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to the extent that the consideration set is likely to have good alternatives or alternatives that
reflect the consumer‟s preferences as a result of screening. Accuracy of the final choice refers to
the correctness of the final choice as a result of screening, given the consumer‟s preferences.
Both these types of decision accuracies are important to consumers. First, an accurate
consideration set is important as alternatives that do not enter the consideration set for further
evaluation may not have any chance to get selected in the final choice stage at all (Nedungadi
1990). Further, consideration set composition can influence brand choice regardless of brand
evaluations and preferences (Nedungadi 1990). Thus, good consideration sets can improve the
chances of making a good choice. Second, making accurate choices is an important motive for
decision makers and forms a basis for selecting strategies that optimize final choice outcomes
(Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993). While the results of the impact of screening strategies on
accuracy of consideration sets is fairly robust (e.g. Heller, Levin, and Goransson 2002; Yaniv
and Schul 1997), the effect on objective accuracy of final choice has received relatively little
attention and therefore, will be the focus of this paper.
Extant literature has mostly investigated the impact of the type of screening strategy used
on the quality of the consideration sets formed. Literature has debated the accuracy obtained by
the use of one screening strategy versus the other. Most findings suggest that exclusion strategy
results in more accurate consideration sets in terms of the proportion of sets that include the
correct answer (Heller, Levin, and Goransson 2002; Yaniv and Schul 1997). However, this
finding for accuracy is confounded with the size of consideration set. When set size was taken
into account, there was no difference in the accuracy of the consideration set formed by using
either strategy (e.g. Heller, Levin, and Goransson 2002). Yaniv and Schul (1997) argued that
consideration sets formed by exclusion were more accurate at the cost of being less informative.
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Thus, screening strategies impact the accuracy of consideration sets due to the fact that the two
screening strategies yield consideration sets of differential sizes.
The impact of using one screening strategy versus the other on the final choice is
however even more contentious. In a study using multiple-choice questions with one correct
response, Heller, Levin, and Goransson (2002) found that participants were slightly more likely
to make accurate choices with exclusion than with inclusion. However, when accounted for the
differences in set sizes there was no difference in the accuracies of final choice obtained by use
of the strategies. Similarly, other research investigating whether the characteristics of the final
choice using inclusion or exclusion strategies differed significantly from each other, echoes these
findings. Levin, Jasper, and Forbes (1998) and Levin et al. (2001) showed that the attribute
weights of final choice did not significantly differ from each other whether participants used an
inclusion or exclusion screening strategy. These studies concluded that using an inclusion or
exclusion screening strategy did not result in attention to different attributes while making final
choice. Finally, Levin, Huneke, and Jasper (2000) also did not find any difference in the quality
of final choice made by inclusion or exclusion screening strategy, where decision quality was
measured as the average value of the chosen option. Thus, extant research that has taken an
outcome-based approach to assess the impact of screening strategies on final choice is
inconclusive.
In this paper, I take a process view of accuracy (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1993),
that assumes a good decision to be one that employs a good process. I argue that to the extent
that screening is viewed as providing the opportunity to improve decision quality, accuracy of
the decision should be examined by the ability of the screening process to enhance the potential
of a good choice. Thus, accuracy of the decision should relate to how the individual decision
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maker can improve decision quality by using one screening strategy versus the other. In this
paper, I extend the notion that the process of screening not only benefits consumers by
preventing bad options from being chosen (Beach 1990, 1993; Beach and Mitchell 1990; Levin,
Huneke, and Jasper 2000), but also the choice of the right screening strategy could enhance the
quality of final choice through process benefits like information search and learning that occur
while screening alternatives. Particularly, I investigate how the accuracies obtained by the use of
screening strategies relate to each other given that consumers face varying levels of uncertainty
during choice.

3.3.2: The Moderating Role of Perceived Uncertainty
Consumers typically perceive uncertainty while making choices (Hansen 1976; Kahn and
Sarin 1988). Consumers may frequently be uncertain of their preferences or how to weight the
attributes while making choices (Dhar and Simonson 2003; Kahn and Meyer 1991). Perceived
uncertainty has been shown to influence various processes during choice, including decision
heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman 1974), attribute weights (Kahn and Meyer 1991), and
information search (Jacoby et al. 1994; Mehta, Rajiv, and Srinivasan 2003). Further, it was also
shown earlier in this dissertation (essay 1) that perceived uncertainty influences the choice of
screening strategy and that the choice of screening strategy was primarily driven by the
perception of accuracy obtained by the use of the screening strategy. Specifically, when
consumers are highly uncertain they are more likely to choose an exclusion screening strategy to
form consideration sets because they perceive that screening by exclusion will help them make
more accurate decisions. Less uncertain consumers on the other hand, are more likely to choose
inclusion as the preferred screening strategy because they perceive that screening by inclusion
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will lead to more accurate decisions. Thus, while the role of perceived accuracy is identified as
an important driver for the choice of screening strategy, it is not clear whether the use of one
screening strategy versus the other will have an impact on the objective accuracy of final choices
made by consumers with varying levels of perceived uncertainty.
In this section, I will argue that the objective accuracy of decisions for highly uncertain
consumers who use inclusion strategy will be higher than if they use exclusion. Similarly, when
consumers who are low on uncertainty use exclusion screening strategy they are likely to make
more accurate decisions than if they use inclusion screening strategy.
The greater accuracy of decisions by using inclusion screening strategy for highly
uncertain consumers is supported by literature on information search in decision making. Extant
literature suggests that use of inclusion screening strategy means a more intense and in-depth
search process. For instance, Levin, Huneke, and Jasper (2000), using a process tracing method
of information acquisition, find that participants who were instructed to include options into the
consideration sets spent more time examining each alternative as compared to those who were
instructed to exclude options from their consideration set. This difference in the intensity of
search was especially evident in the choice stage where participants chose one alternative from
the consideration set. Moreover, in the same study, participants screening by inclusion searched
information regarding more number of attributes per alternative (mean = 4.7 attributes per
alternative) as compared to those who screened by exclusion (mean = 3 attributes per alternative)
indicating a more broader search in the inclusion condition (Levin, Huneke, and Jasper 2000).
Finally, in the same study, participants using inclusion screening strategy also acquired slightly
more information per attribute than those using exclusion, although this difference did not reach
statistical significance. This implies that use of inclusion screening strategy involves
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significantly greater information search, a finding which was especially pronounced during the
choice stage of decision making (Levin, Huneke, and Jasper 2000).
One reasoning why using inclusion screening strategy may mean more intense search
comes from understanding consideration sets themselves. In general, consideration sets represent
a small subset of all available options (Hauser and Wernerfelt 1990). Thus, while forming a
consideration set from all available alternatives (e.g., four out of 10 brands), the use of inclusion
screening strategy will involve fewer decisions than exclusion screening strategy (i.e., four
selection decisions in inclusion screening strategy vs. six rejection decisions in exclusion
screening strategy).
Fewer number of decisions means that each decision acquires more significance and will
lead to more effort expended by consumers during the decision making at each step. On the
contrary, when consumers make more number of decisions, each decision becomes
comparatively less important and consumers will apply less effort during each decision. Thus,
application of inclusion strategy would lead to more information search at each decision step
versus fewer searches for each step with the application of exclusion strategy.
Greater use of available information is related to decision quality. For example, Payne,
Bettman, and Johnson (1993, p.89) argue that “a good decision requires the use of all relevant
information”. From this perspective, decision strategies that use all relevant information and
allow weighing the information appropriately are associated with more accurate decisions. Thus,
compensatory decision strategies like the weighted additive model have been shown to lead to
the most accurate decisions (e.g. Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993).
Greater search and use of available information will be especially beneficial to consumers
high in uncertainty. For example, Simonson, Huber, and Payne (1988) demonstrate that
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consumers that have more uncertain beliefs are more likely to start information search very early
on in the choice process. Further, every piece of additional information acquired will
significantly help uncertain consumers in the evaluation process. For instance, Meyer (1987) has
shown that each additional exposure to information can facilitate the process of product
evaluation, especially when consumers were unfamiliar with the product class and unclear about
the judgment criteria. In the absence of this information, highly uncertain consumers do not
have clear preference structures and are more likely to fall prey to biases that may reduce the
quality of decisions. Thus, uncertain consumers are likely to make relatively better decisions
using inclusion screening strategy.
Information obtained from greater search, on the other hand, will hurt consumers with
low uncertainty. Such consumers generally have a more clear preference structure and are more
aware about how to weigh the attributes. However, the increase in information size may
potentially dilute their preferences and lead to making choices that may not reflect their true
preferences. Some evidence for this is provided by the findings that larger variety in options
might confuse consumers leading to weaker preferences and lower choice probability (e.g. Dhar
1997; Greenleaf and Lehmann 1995; Iyengar and Lepper 2000; Simonson 1999). Further,
Meyvis and Janiszewski (2002) also show that when presented with information that is not
relevant to the evaluation of a product benefit, consumers incorporate the irrelevant information
in product perception even when they acknowledge the attribute as irrelevant, thus diluting their
preferences . Taken together, this evidence suggest that encountering a large amount of
information may change preference for options that may not reflect the initial preferences for
consumers low on uncertainty. Therefore, using inclusion screening strategy which involves
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more information search may reduce the objective decision accuracy for consumers that are low
on uncertainty.

3.3.4: The Moderating Role of Consideration Set Size
As discussed above, the moderating role of perceived uncertainty on the relationship
between screening strategy and objective accuracy of decision is driven by the intensity of search
that occurs when making varying number of decisions. Therefore, factors that impact search
intensity should also influence the interactive relationship between perceived uncertainty and
screening strategy on decision accuracy. I argue that consideration set size is one such factor
because it influences search intensity during decision making.
Consideration set size refers to the number of alternatives in the consideration set that
consumers evaluate before making the final choice (Desai and Hoyer 2000). The moderating role
of consideration set size is supported by the mechanism of search intensity discussed earlier, by
altering the number of decisions made with inclusion or exclusion screening strategy. As
discussed earlier, when consumers form smaller consideration sets (i.e., less than half of all
available alternatives), the use of inclusion screening strategy involves fewer decision steps than
exclusion screening. As a consequence, consumers search more intensively because each
decision acquires more importance. Greater search benefits highly uncertain consumers by
allowing them to develop preferences and thus make decisions with higher objective accuracy.
Consumers with lower levels of perceived uncertainty are hurt by extensive search as it dilutes
their preferences and therefore reduces the objective accuracy of their decisions.
The interactive effect of perceived uncertainty and screening strategy on objective
decision accuracy reverses however, in the presence of larger consideration sets. When forming
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larger consideration sets (i.e., more than half of all available alternatives), exclusion screening
strategy involves fewer decisions than inclusion screening. Since majority of the available
alternatives will be retained in the consideration set, rejecting alternatives will require fewer
decisions than selecting alternatives. Therefore, while forming larger consideration sets, each
decision will acquire more gravity in exclusion screening strategy than in inclusion screening.
Consequently, search intensity will be greater in exclusion screening strategy than in inclusion
screening strategy. Greater search will be more beneficial to highly uncertain consumers to
develop their preferences and make decisions with higher objective accuracy. Consumers with
lower levels of perceived uncertainty will be hurt by extensive search as their initial preferences
get diluted and they make decisions with lower decision accuracy.

---------------------------------------------------------Insert figure 3.1 about here
----------------------------------------------------------

In summary, I argue that consideration set size moderates the interactive relationship
between perceived uncertainty and screening strategy on objective accuracy of decisions. More
formally,

H1:

Consideration set size moderates the effect of perceived uncertainty on the
screening strategy-decision accuracy relationship. Specifically:
H1a: When forming smaller consideration sets, consumers with high (low) levels
of uncertainty who use inclusion (exclusion) screening strategy are likely to make
more objectively accurate decisions than if they use exclusion (inclusion)
screening strategy.
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H1b: When forming larger consideration sets, consumers with high (low) levels of
uncertainty who use exclusion (inclusion) screening strategy are likely to make
more objectively accurate decisions than if they use inclusion (exclusion)
screening strategy.

In an experimental study, which I discuss next, I test the moderating role of consideration
set size on the interactive relationship between perceived uncertainty and screening strategy on
objective accuracy of the decision.

3.4: Study

3.4.1: Method
One-hundred and thirty business students participated in a study that followed a 2
(perceived uncertainty: high or low) x 2 (screening strategy: inclusion or exclusion) x 2
(consideration set size: small or large) between-subjects design. In the study, screening strategy
and consideration set sizes were experimentally manipulated whereas perceived uncertainty was
measured for each participant in the study. Participants received partial course credit in exchange
for participating in this study.
Before completing the main experimental task, participants were asked to complete a
practice task on the computer. The purpose of this task was to familiarize participants with
MouselabWeb, the computer program which was used to create and run this study.
MouselabWeb is a process tracing tool that can be used to monitor participants‟ information
acquisition and use while making decisions and has been used in numerous consumer decision
making studies (e.g. Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993).
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The practice task required participants to choose one camera after they looked at
descriptions of two cameras that were described on three features. Respondents had to move the
mouse over the box to view the information regarding the feature for each camera. The
information behind the boxes was visible until the mouse pointer was moved out of the box. The
main objective of this task was to allow participants to become familiar with using the mouse to
view information and choose an option. Once participants completed this task they were
directed to the main task.
For the experimental task, participants engaged in a two-stage choice process:
consideration set formation and choice, and were randomly assigned to one of four conditions.
They were asked to imagine that they were a purchase officer of a company and were in the
process of buying laptops for the company. The supplier had provided them with information
regarding twenty-five laptops. Each laptop was described on six different features: screen size,
weight, memory, hard drive, processor, and battery life. The descriptions of the twenty-five
laptops were created such that there were no clearly superior or inferior laptops.

---------------------------------------------------------Insert table 3.1 and table 3.2 about here
----------------------------------------------------------

The purchase manager‟s task was to form a smaller subset of laptops for further
evaluation. In this study I manipulated consideration set size by asking participants to form either
a smaller set of five or a larger set of twenty laptops from the available twenty-five laptops. At
this point, screening strategy was manipulated by telling participants to form a smaller subset of
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laptops using either inclusion or exclusion screening strategy (adapted from Levin et al. 2001).
Using the inclusion screening strategy meant that participants would look at all the laptops,
decide which laptops they would seriously consider for buying and include them in their list.
Using the exclusion strategy meant that participants would look at all the laptops, decide which
laptops they would not seriously consider for buying and exclude them from their list. After
participants completed the screening task, they were asked to look at the smaller subset of
laptops they had created and either select the one laptop they would like to buy or reject all
except the one they would like to buy. For the sake of consistency, participants used the same
strategy in both stages of the choice process. There was no time constraint and participants could
take as long as they wanted to complete the task.
Participants completed a brief questionnaire after finishing the choice task. They were
asked to indicate how important each of the six features was to them in choosing the laptop.
Participants rated the perceived importance of each feature on a seven-point scale anchored by 1
= “least important” and 10 = “most important”. I computed the variability across the importance
ratings of the six features for each participant. Variability in ratings have been linked to
subjective uncertainty in the choice process, such that higher the variability, lower the perceived
uncertainty. For example, Wyer (1973) argued and showed that there is less uncertainty related
to extreme ratings than when the ratings are less polarized because polarized ratings are held
with less ambiguity. Further, extreme ratings on the importance scale indicate greater knowledge
of preferences and hence lower preference uncertainty. Finally, extreme values are easier to
evaluate (Fischer, Luce, and Jia 2000) and greater variability increases discriminability of
information and should make trade-offs easier Louviere (2001). Thus, all participants with
variability scores above the median value were coded as low perceived uncertainty and those
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with variability scores below the median value were coded as high perceived uncertainty. This
measure served as the measure of the independent variable – perceived uncertainty, and will be
used in further analysis.
The dependent variable was objective accuracy of choice and was computed as:
Weighted Additive Value Choice - Weighted Additive Value Worst
Weighted Additive Value Best - Weighted Additive Value Worst
This measure was adapted from Creyer, Bettman, and Payne (1990). The compensatory
weighted additive rule reflects the normative procedure of processing all information and making
tradeoffs and has been used as a criterion of decision effectiveness in multiattribute choice
(Zakay and Wooler 1984). The measure of accuracy of the decision can be derived by comparing
the weighted additive value of the chosen alternative to that of the best and worst alternatives in
the set. This measure of relative accuracy is bounded by a value of 1 if the best alternative is
chosen and a value of 0 if the worst alternative is selected (Creyer, Bettman, and Payne 1990;
Johnson and Payne 1985; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993). The weighted additive value of
the alternatives was computed as the sum of product of the importance ratings and the value of
each attribute.

3.4.2: Results
The objective accuracy of choice was subjected to a 2 (perceived uncertainty) x 2
(screening strategy) x 2(consideration set size) ANOVA. First, there was a significant main
effect of perceived uncertainty on decision accuracy (Mhigh uncertainty = .82 vs. Mlow uncertainty = .90;
F(1, 122) = 5.58, p < .05). Second, there were no significant main effects of either screening
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strategy (F(1, 122) = .01, NS) or consideration set size (F(1, 122) = 1.90, NS) on objective
accuracy of the decision.
There were no significant two-way interactions in the model. First, the interaction
between perceived uncertainty and screening strategy was not significant (F(1, 122) = 1.82, NS).
Second, the interaction between perceived uncertainty and consideration set size was not
significant (F(1, 122) = 1.42, NS). Third, the interaction between screening strategy and
consideration set size also did not reach statistical significance (F(1, 122) = .10, NS). This was
not surprising, given that H1 predicted a three-way interaction between perceived uncertainty,
screening strategy, and consideration set size. Importantly, there was a significant three-way
interaction among perceived uncertainty, screening strategy, and consideration set size, as
hypothesized in H1 (F(1,122) = 8.34, p < .01). Thus, H1 was supported.
To explain the three-way interaction, I examined the interaction between perceived
uncertainty and screening strategy separately under smaller and larger consideration set
conditions. When participants formed smaller consideration sets, the interaction between
perceived uncertainty and screening strategy was not significant (F(1,60) = 1.19, NS). However,
a careful examination of means across conditions shows that as hypothesized, when forming
smaller consideration sets, participants with low perceived uncertainty made slightly more
accurate decisions using exclusion screening strategy (M = .92) as compared to those using
inclusion screening strategy (M = .88) (F(1,60) = .32, NS). On the other hand, for participants
with high perceived uncertainty, the objective accuracy of decision was slightly higher for those
who used inclusion (M = .89) as compared to those who used exclusion screening strategy (M =
.83) (F(1,60) = .98, NS). Thus, although the results did not reach statistical significance, H1a
received directional support. The pattern of results was however, reversed for larger
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consideration sets with a significant interaction between perceived uncertainty and screening
strategy (F(1,62) = 8.94, p <.01). When forming larger consideration sets, participants with low
perceived uncertainty made more accurate decisions using inclusion screening strategy (M = .96)
as compared to those using exclusion (M = .82) (F(1, 62) = 4.24, p <.05). Participants with high
perceived uncertainty on the other hand, made more accurate decisions using exclusion screening
strategy (M = .85) as compared to those who screened by inclusion (M = .69) (F(1, 62) = 4.70, p
<.05). Thus, H1b was fully supported.

-------------------------------------------------------------------Insert table 3.3 and figure 3.2 about here
---------------------------------------------------------------------

3.4.3: Discussion
The results of this study are mostly consistent with predictions regarding the moderating
roles of perceived uncertainty and consideration set size on the screening strategy-decision
accuracy relationship. First, as hypothesized I demonstrated a three-way interaction between
perceived uncertainty, screening strategy, and consideration set size on objective decision
accuracy. While the results for smaller consideration sets were in the direction as hypothesized,
the interactive effect of perceived uncertainty and screening strategy on decision accuracy did
not reach statistical significance. However, for larger consideration sets, results completely
support the predictions. Thus, this study shows that the number of options in the consideration
set from which the consumer chooses from has an impact on the joint effects of perceived
uncertainty and screening strategy on decision accuracy.
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3.5: General Discussion and Conclusion
This dissertation aimed to address two important issues regarding the use of screening
strategies in decision making: the antecedent and consequence of using one screening strategy
versus the other. The first essay investigated the role of perceived uncertainty in the choice of
screening strategy. Consumers frequently face uncertainty while making choices and the
perception of uncertainty has been shown to influence judgment and decision making in a variety
of ways including the use of decision heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman 1974), weighting of
attributes (Kahn and Meyer 1991), and information search (Jacoby et al. 1994; Mehta, Rajiv, and
Srinivasan 2003). In essay one, I demonstrated that perceived uncertainty influences the choice
of screening strategy such that consumers with high perceived uncertainty are more likely to
choose exclusion screening strategy whereas those with low perceived uncertainty are more
likely to choose inclusion screening strategy. Further, this relationship flips when consumers
form larger consideration sets. More importantly, the perception of accuracy obtained by the use
of screening strategy is the primary driver of the perceived uncertainty – screening strategy
relationship. This finding adds to our understanding of how the perception of uncertainty
influences an intermediate step in the decision making process – screening.
An important finding in essay one is that the malleability in the choice of screening
strategy occurs primarily because consumers want to make good decisions. This finding is in line
with the idea that making accurate decisions is an important motive for decision makers (Payne,
Bettman, and Johnson 1993) and screening enhances the chances of making a good decision by
allowing good options to be considered while preventing bad alternatives from being considered
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for choice (Beach 1990; 1993). Thus, it is important to understand how accurate are the decisions
obtained by the use of screening strategies.
Essay two seeks to address the issue of decision accuracy of screening strategies, given
the perceived uncertainty consumers experience during the choice process. There is limited
research that has examined the impact of screening strategies on the accuracy of final choice
(e.g. Heller, Levin, and Goransson 2002). Further, results have been inconclusive for the
differential impact of screening strategies on final choice. This research examines the role of
screening strategies on the objective accuracy of choice and also explicates the interactive roles
of perceived uncertainty and consideration set size on the screening strategy – decision accuracy
relationship. This dissertation is consistent with the view that screening enhances the potential of
a good choice (Beach 1990, 1993; Beach and Mitchell 1990). Additionally, consumers choose
the strategy that they perceive will lead to good choices. Thus, decision quality should relate to
how the process of screening can improve the quality of choice, especially given the perception
of uncertainty. In essay two, I show that screening improves the accuracy of final choice and the
process is moderated by perceived uncertainty and consideration set size. Thus, screening can
greatly enhance the quality of decisions through the process of information search and learning
that occurs while choosing and applying the right screening strategy.
One important aspect of this dissertation is that it has utilized a variety of methodologies
(laboratory experiment and verbal protocol analysis), samples (students and adult contestants in
the game show), decision making contexts (video games, apartment renal, TV game show, laptop
purchase), experimental set up (scenario-based and actual choice context), and experimental
designs (within-subject and between-subjects) to help answer the research questions.
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Triangulation of results using various methods and sources of data add robustness to the
inferences made herein.
This dissertation contributes to existing literature in screening strategies and decision
making. While essay one focused on the antecedents of choosing a screening strategy, essay two
examined the consequence of using the screening strategy. This research furthers our current
understanding of the factors that influence the choice of screening strategies by demonstrating
the role of perceived uncertainty and consideration set size in the choice of screening strategy.
This research concurs that there is no “default” screening strategy for consumers, but rather the
choice of screening strategy itself is adaptive in nature as is most decision making (Payne,
Bettman and Johnson 1993). Also, this dissertation seeks to further our understanding regarding
the consequence of using the screening strategies. Decision accuracy is an important outcome of
the decision making process and has huge public policy and consumer welfare implications.
Most importantly this dissertation shows that perceived uncertainty and consideration set size are
both important factors impacting the perception of accuracy as well as the accuracy of final
choice. However, their effect is in opposite directions. Essay one showed that consumers choose
a screening strategy in the anticipation of increasing accuracy of their decision. However, as
shown in essay two, the objective accuracy of decisions may not correspond to the perceptions of
accuracy that consumers have. Thus, consumers could make suboptimal choices through the use
of wrong screening strategy. Such suboptimal choices can have very seriously negative and long
lasting consequences in various situations like medical decision making, financial and
investment decision making, partner selection etc. that are rife with uncertainty.
This dissertation highlights the important distinction between anticipation of accuracy
and experienced accuracy (Kleinmuntz and Schkade 1993). For example, Fennema and
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Kleinmuntz (1995) showed that decision makers have limited ability to anticipate the effort and
accuracy consequences of their decisions. They demonstrated that participants were worse off
anticipating accuracy than they were at anticipating effort related to the strategies and that they
only insufficiently updated their accuracy anticipations after several trials and explicit feedback.
This raises questions whether the suboptimal choices result from “overconfidence or
underconfidence traps” (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips 1982). Further, it is also important
to understand how decision makers could be nudged to choose the right screening strategy and
make good decisions. Future research must investigate these issues in more detail. While the
focus of analysis in essay two of this dissertation is the objective decision accuracy, future
research also needs to investigate the process during choice to understand the underlying
mechanisms like information search and the effect of search strategies that renders choices made
with one screening strategy suboptimal as compared to the other.
In summary, this dissertation examines the antecedents and consequences of screening
strategies and highlights the role of perceived uncertainty on screening strategy selection as well
as on the outcome of screening – decision accuracy.
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Table 3.1: Attributes Used to Describe Alternatives in the Stimuli (Laptops)

Attributes / Levels

Level 1

Level 2

Level 3

Screen Size

15.4 inches

14.1 inches

13.3 inches

Weight

4.5 lb.

5.0 lb.

5.4 lb.

Memory

4GB

3GB

2GB

Hard drive

250GB

200GB

160GB

Processor

2.4 GHz

2.0 GHz

1.83GHz

Battery Life

4.0hr – 5.7hr

3.9hr – 5.5hr

3.0hr – 4.5hr

69

Table 3.2: Description of Alternatives used as Stimuli (25 Laptops)

Alternative
Brand 1
Brand 2
Brand 3
Brand 4
Brand 5
Brand 6
Brand 7
Brand 8
Brand 9
Brand 10
Brand 11
Brand 12
Brand 13
Brand 14
Brand 15
Brand 16
Brand 17
Brand 18
Brand 19
Brand 20
Brand 21
Brand 22
Brand 23
Brand 24
Brand 25

Screen
Size
15.4”
14.1”
13.3”
13.3”
14.1”
15.4”
15.4”
14.1”
13.3”
13.3”
14.1”
15.4”
15.4”
14.1”
13.3”
13.3”
14.1”
15.4”
15.4”
14.1”
13.3”
13.3”
14.1”
15.4”
15.4”

Weight

Memory

5.0 lbs
5.4 lbs
4.5 lbs
5.0 lbs
4.5 lbs
5.4 lbs
5.0 lbs
5.4 lbs
4.5 lbs
5.0 lbs
4.5 lbs
5.4 lbs
5.0 lbs
5.4 lbs
4.5 lbs
5.0 lbs
4.5 lbs
5.4 lbs
5.0 lbs
5.4 lbs
4.5 lbs
5.0 lbs
4.5 lbs
5.4 lbs
5.0 lbs

2GB
4GB
3GB
4GB
2GB
3GB
2GB
4GB
3GB
4GB
2GB
3GB
2GB
4GB
3GB
4GB
2GB
3GB
2GB
4GB
3GB
4GB
2GB
3GB
2GB
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Hard
Drive
250GB
200GB
160GB
160GB
200GB
250GB
200GB
160GB
160GB
200GB
250GB
250GB
160GB
160GB
200GB
250GB
250GB
200GB
160GB
200GB
250GB
250GB
200GB
160GB
200GB

Processor

Battery Life

2.0 Ghz
1.83 Ghz
2.4 Ghz
2.0 Ghz
2.4 Ghz
1.83 Ghz
1.83 Ghz
2.4 Ghz
2.0 Ghz
2.4 Ghz
1.83 Ghz
2.0 Ghz
2.4 Ghz
2.0 Ghz
2.4 Ghz
1.83 Ghz
2.0 Ghz
1.83 Ghz
2.0 Ghz
2.4 Ghz
1.83 Ghz
2.0 Ghz
1.83 Ghz
2.4 Ghz
2.4 Ghz

3.0hr -4.5hr
4.0hr -5.7hr
3.9hr -5.5hr
4.0hr -5.7hr
3.0hr -4.5hr
3.9hr -5.5hr
4.0hr -5.7hr
3.9hr -5.5hr
4.0hr -5.7hr
3.0hr -4.5hr
3.9hr -5.5hr
3.0hr -4.5hr
3.9hr -5.5hr
4.0hr -5.7hr
3.0hr -4.5hr
3.9hr -5.5hr
3.0hr -4.5hr
4.0hr -5.7hr
4.0hr -5.7hr
3.0hr -4.5hr
3.9hr -5.5hr
3.0hr -4.5hr
4.0hr -5.7hr
3.9hr -5.5hr
3.0hr -4.5hr

Table 3.3: Means of Objective Accuracy of Decision

Consideration

Perceived

Screening

Objective

Set Size

Uncertainty

Strategy

Accuracy

Small

Low

Inclusion

.88
(.20)

Small

Low

Exclusion

.92
(.21)

Small

High

Inclusion

.89
(.13)

Small

High

Exclusion

.83
(.25)

Large

Low

Inclusion

.96
(.06)

Large

Low

Exclusion

.82
(.21)

Large

High

Inclusion

.69
(.30)

Large

High

Exclusion

.85
(.17)

Note: Standard deviations are provided in parentheses.
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Consideration
Set Size

Screening
Strategy

Perceived
Uncertainty

Objective
Accuracy of
Decision

Search
Intensity

Figure 3.1: Proposed Model for the Moderating Roles of Perceived Uncertainty and Consideration Set Size on the
Screening Strategy – Decision Accuracy Relationship
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Panel A: Small Consideration Sets

1

Inclusion

Decision Accuracy

0.95
0.9

Exclusion

0.92
0.89

0.88

0.83

0.85
0.8
0.75
0.7
0.65
Low uncertainty

High Uncertainty

Panel B: Large Consideration Sets

1

0.96

Inclusion

Decision Accuracy

0.95

Exclusion

0.9
0.85
0.85

0.82

0.8
0.75
0.69

0.7
0.65
Low uncertainty

High Uncertainty

Figure 3.2: The Moderating Effects of Perceived Uncertainty and Consideration
Set Size on the Screening Strategy – Decision Accuracy Relationship
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APPENDIX: IRB HUMAN SUBJECTS PERMISSION LETTER
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